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ABSTRACT 
 
Investors in an initial public offering (IPO) face a lack-of-information problem: they have to 
guess the new stock’s aftermarket price. This problem poses a risk in the absence of a 
consensus among the investors’ pre-issue opinions and the risk is greater when the opinions are 
more divergent. We model this lack-of-information problem in an IPO, where, to place a 
certain number of the shares, the issuer adjusts the offer price to accommodate the difference in 
the demand between the pre-issue market and the aftermarket. By examining a large sample of 
IPOs, we obtain strong evidence in support of the model’s predictions for IPO underpricing 
and sales. 
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Participants in an initial public offering (IPO), including the issuer, underwriter, and 
investors, face a lack-of-information problem. That is, there is no available information on the 
new stock’s current market price. Hence, an investor who wishes to purchase the stock from the 
IPO has to guess its market value. When there is no consensus in the pre-market beliefs, this 
lack-of-information problem poses a risk to the investor. His guess may suffer from a 
systematic bias owing to the divergent opinions of heterogeneous investors. That is, his 
personal belief may systematically deviate from the market’s expectation. This risk is greater 
when the opinions are more divergent. On the other hand, divergent opinions do not pose a risk 
in an efficient secondary market where the stock price is public information and all investors 
take it as the market value regardless of differing personal beliefs and preferences. 
To model this lack-of-information problem, we start with the pre-market demand of 
heterogeneous investors for the new issue. As the risk arising from this problem increases when 
the opinions are more divergent, we derive the demand as a decreasing function of the degree 
of opinion divergence. We then characterize the issuer’s two-dimension decision, IPO pricing 
and sales, constrained by the pre-market demand and the issuer’s sales objective. We obtain the 
closed-form solution and derive testable predictions: As the degree of opinion divergence 
increases (i) underpricing increases and (ii) fewer shares are placed in the IPO. 
Many previous studies have modeled IPO underpricing. Such models assume information 
asymmetry, one way or the other, between the different participants in an IPO. For instance, 
Rock (1986) argues that information is asymmetric between investors, where some investors 
are informed and others are uninformed. Consequently, there is an adverse selection problem 
that requires the issue to be underpriced to attract uninformed investors. Information can also 
be asymmetric between the issuer and investors. When the issuer is better informed than 
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investors of the firm’s fundamentals, as in Allen and Fauhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang 
(1989), and Welch (1989), high quality issuers may have an incentive to use underpricing as a 
signal to differentiate themselves from low quality issuers. In particular, as Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) and Sherman and Titman (2002) argue, institutional investors may possess better 
information than the issuer and the underwriter on the market demand. Hence, underpricing 
may be used to motivate investors to truthfully reveal costly private information. 
Instead of assuming asymmetric information, our model builds on the lack-of-information 
problem facing all participants in an IPO: there is initially no public or private information on 
the market demand. This problem in the presence of divergent opinions leads to underpricing. 
By specifying the degree of divergence, our model establishes a link between IPO decision 
variables and any information-related factors, including asymmetric information, that affect the 
difficulty of pricing. Another distinct feature of our model is that it simultaneously 
characterizes two interrelated IPO decisions, that is, the offer price and the sale of the stock. As 
our results are derived in terms of pre-market opinion divergence, our model gives predictions 
that are directly testable. 
In the second part of this study, we test our predictions using the sample of IPOs conducted 
during the period 1991-2004. We identify three proxy variables for the degree of pre-market 
opinion divergence, which are the filing price range, the absolute value of price update, and the 
absolute value of error in prediction for the immediate aftermarket price. With each of the 
proxy variables, we document evidence in strong support of the model. We find that as the 
degree of pre-market divergence increases, IPO underpricing increases and the shares sold in 
the offering is reduced. 
We note that our model is conceptually different from Miller’s (1977) theory that predicts a 
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link between the new stock’s price and investor divergence in the post-issue market. In Miller 
(1977), a positive initial return occurs because the aftermarket price is pushed up, higher than 
the stock’s intrinsic value, by optimistic investors. As such, IPO initial returns are viewed as 
new stock overvaluation in the aftermarket trading dictated by optimistic investors, instead of a 
consequence of new issue underpricing. The driving factor in Miller’s (1977) model is a short 
sale constraint that deters a secondary market equilibrium price. Therefore, in this model, IPO 
short-term overvaluation is necessarily followed by long-term underperformance.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I briefly discusses the literature of IPO underpricing 
and highlights our work in contrast to existing studies. Section II describes our model of the 
IPO decision in the pre-issue market with heterogeneous investors facing a lack-of-information 
problem. We derive the closed-form solution and discuss its predictions. Section III presents 
our empirical test for the model. In addition to various robustness checks, in this section we 
also discuss the essential differences between Miller (1977) and our model in terms of 
empirical findings. Section IV concludes the paper. 
I.   Literature 
A number of studies in the finance literature examine the IPO underpricing phenomenon, of 
which many are based on asymmetric information. Rock (1986) presents a model assuming 
asymmetric information among investors, in which some investors are better informed than 
others. When there are good signals about the firm, the informed investors will crowd out the 
uninformed ones. Hence, the orders of the uninformed investors are filled only if the signals are 
bad and the shares are unwanted by the informed investors. In order to make the orders 
attractive to uninformed investors, the offering firm must set the price of the new shares at a 
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discount. More recent studies address asymmetric information between issuers/underwriters 
and outside investors. In Allen and Faulhaber (1988), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch 
(1989), issuers are better informed than the investors about the firm’s future prospects and high 
quality issuers have incentives to signal their future prospect by underpricing the new issue. 
High-quality issuers are differentiated from low-quality issuers because only good firms are 
expected to recover their initial loss from subsequent seasonal offerings. On the other hand, 
Benveniste and Splidt (1989) model the IPO as an auction process, in which the underwriter 
uses the book-building process to collect private information from informed investors. The new 
stock is sold at a discount to compensate the investors for revealing costly private information. 
Consistent with this theory, Hanley (1993) provides evidence showing that underwriters do not 
fully adjust the offer price upward when the demand is strong. As underwriters only partially 
incorporate the positive information revealed during the book-building process in the finalized 
offer price, such investors are compensated by receiving more underpriced shares. 
Apart from asymmetric information-based models, other theories have been proposed to 
explain IPO underpricing. Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) argue that the issuer may 
strategically underprice the offer in order to generate information momentum by attracting 
more analyst research activities and media coverage. When such information momentum 
pushes up the demand, the owners benefit by selling the shares after the lockup period expires. 
Tinic (1988) and Hughes and Thakor (1992) contend that new issues are underpriced because 
the issuers and the investment banks want to avoid the legal risk. Rydqvist (1997) highlights 
the tax advantage of IPO underpricing to issuers as well as underwriters.  
In this study, we model the lack-of-information problem in the presence of pre-market 
divergent opinions on the value of the IPO. Opinion divergence matters in the IPO market, 
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where investors have to guess the stock’s value without observing its current market price. In 
order to sell a certain number of the shares, the issuer underprices the issue to overcome the 
demand differential between the pre-market and the aftermarket. On the other hand, divergent 
opinions do not pose a risk in an efficient secondary market where stock price is public 
information, which presents the market value regardless of investors’ personal beliefs and 
preferences. 
In a related theory, Miller (1977) explains the phenomenon of IPO underpricing by the co-
existence of investor divergence and short selling constraints. He argues that owing to short 
selling constraints, investor’s divergence results in overvaluation of the new stock. This occurs 
because the equilibrium price will show the expectation of only those optimistic investors while 
the information of those pessimistic investors can not be incorporated into the stock price 
because of the short selling constraint. According to Miller, new issue returns are phenomena 
resulting from short-term overvaluation in the constrained aftermarket, instead of a result of 
pre-issue market underpricing.  
A recent study by Edwards and Hanley (2007) provides a direct test of Miller’s (1977) 
theory. By examining newly available data, they find that while greater short selling is 
observed in IPOs with positive high initial returns, short selling does not limit observed 
underpricing. The authors conclude that the evidence is inconsistent with theoretical models 
that predict high initial returns, in part, by assuming constraints on short sales. Consistent with 
Edwards and Hanley (2007), our empirical results in this study provide evidence to show that 
the variation in IPO underpricing is related to divergence factors in the pre-issue market but not 
to the variation in post-IPO divergence orthogonal to the pre-market factors. In other words, 
underpricing is not driven by investor divergence in the secondary market other than 
 6
uncertainty factors unique to the pre-issue market.  
II.   Theory 
A.  Investors’ Decision:  The Pre-market Demand 
The dynamics of stock price can be generally described by geometric Brownian motion: 
    tptppp ttttt Δ+Δ+=Δ+ εσμ     (1) 
where tp  and ttp Δ+  are stock price at time t  and tt Δ+ , respectively, μ  is the expected rate of 
return per unit of time, σ  is the price volatility, and ε  is a random drawing from a 
standardized normal distribution. The second term represents the expected return over the 
period of tΔ , and the third term represents the stock’s fundamental risk.  
To apply this model to the pricing of an IPO, we consider a risk-averse investor, i, who 
faces an investment decision in a new issue at time 0=t . He either purchases one share of the 
stock from the IPO, paying the offer price 0p , or uses the same amount of money to purchase 
risk-free bonds for a short period, tΔ , until the share price is realized in the immediate 
aftermarket. Given that any shares purchased from the pre-market can be sold immediately 
after the stock starts to trade, we examine the investor’s expected utility in the immediate 
aftermarket at time tt Δ= .  
The market value of the new stock is unknown in the pre-market; hence, the investor has to 
guess this value based on his personal belief. Assume that the stock is worth eiV  to the investor. 
As investors are heterogeneous, this value can be different from the market valuation. Without 
the information on market demand, the investor’s best guess of the stock value is: 
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            i
e
i
e
i Vp θ+= .     (2) 
The error term iθ  presents the investor’s subjective assessment of the deviation of his personal 
valuation from market valuation, which depends on opinion divergence in the pre-issue market. 
In the investor’s eyes, iθ  is uniformly distributed between δ−  and δ , thus it has zero mean 
and variance of 2
3
1δ . We take δ  to be the measure of the degree of opinion divergence. For 
simplicity and without losing generality, we use δ for all investors.  
Using eip  to replace tp  in equation (1), we obtain the investor’s expected aftermarket price 
at time tΔ  conditional on his pre-market belief: 
tptpppp ei
e
i
e
i
e
i
e
i
e
i
e
t Δ+Δ+=Δ εσμ ,   (3) 
where the superscript e denotes expectation. eiμ  and eiσ  are parameters based on the investor’s 
belief, which are related to eip .  
In a secondary market, tp  is publicly observed, so t
e
i pp = , μμ =ei , σσ =ei  and, as 
equation (1) shows, investors only bear the fundamental risk. For the new issue, there is another 
source of risk, namely, the investor’s personal belief may be systematically different from the 
market expectation V (or VV ei ≠ ). Without the market valuation information, this difference is 
not observed and cannot be estimated by investors holding divergent opinions.1 
On the other hand, after the book-building process is completed, the issuer/underwriter 
                                                          
1 In reality, investors do have some information on a new issue that can be used to adjust, to a 
certain extent, their personal valuation toward the market value. However, this real-world situation does 
not undermine the notion that individual investors are unable to systematically predict the value of a 
new issue, which is the starting point of our model. 
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learns about the distribution of eiV  and thus the demand curve. Assume that 
e
iV  is uniformly 
distributed between hV −  and hV + , where 0>h . The aggregation of pre-market beliefs leads 
to the unbiased market valuation at the stock’s intrinsic value, ( ) VVE eii = . This value 
determines the aftermarket price.  
The distribution of eiV  is conceptually different from that of iθ . As a consequence of 
investor heterogeneity, the distribution of eiV  is objective and it continues to be present in the 
secondary market. On the other hand, the distribution of iθ  is subjective, which disappears 
after the stock price is realized in the aftermarket where all investors set t
e
i pp = . 
Substituting relation (2) into equation (3) and assuming independence between iθ  and ε , 
we have: 
     ( ) ( )tVppE eieieie t Δ+=Δ μ1 , 
        ( ) ( ) tVtpp eieieieiet Δ+Δ+=Δ 2222 131Var σμδ . 
If the investor purchases the stock from the IPO, his certainty equivalent is  
             ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ Δ+Δ+−Δ+ tVttV eieieieiei 2222 131211 σμδρμ , 
where ρ is the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion, which, for simplicity, we use for all 
investors. On the other hand, the investor’s utility from holding risk-free bonds is ( )trp f Δ+10 . 
Therefore, he would choose to purchase the stock from the offering only if the following 
condition holds: 
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    ( ) ( ) ( )trptVttV feieieieiei Δ+>⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ Δ+Δ+−Δ+ 1131211 02222 σμδρμ .  
Taking the investment period from the pre-market to the immediate aftermarket to be 
approximately one day, 365/1≈Δt  and thus all terms with tΔ  are relatively small. Ignoring 
those terms, we simplify the above condition as follows: 
     20
2
0 6
1or
6
1 ρδρδ −<+> eiei VppV .   (4) 
That is, the investor would purchase the stock from the offering if the offer price is lower than 
his believed value by an amount of 2
6
1 ρδ− . This amount increases with the degree of risk 
aversion and the investor’s assessment of opinion divergence.  
The investor’s pre-market demand is 
    
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ +>=
otherwise0
6
1    if1 20 ρδpV
D
e
i
i  
Suppose there are total K investors in the market who are potential buyers of the issue. The 
number of investors whose guessed values are in the range of eidV  is 
e
idVh
K
2
 . The aggregate 
pre-market demand as a function of the offer price 0p  is 
( )
( )02
6
10
2122
220
pV
h
K
h
KK
dV
h
KpD
hV
p
e
i
−+−=
= ∫ ++
ρδ
ρδ
.  (5) 
The demand curve has standard properties. It is decreasing in the offer price, and its 
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sensitivity to price increases as investors become more homogeneous (i.e., as h  decreases). In 
particular, the second term in equation (5) indicates that the demand decreases as investors 
become more risk-averse and opinions are more divergent. This term presents a unique feature 
of the pre-market. To show the difference in demand between the pre-market and the 
aftermarket, let 0→δ  and tppV == 0  to obtain ( ) 2
KpD t = . This is the equilibrium 
secondary-market demand, in which stock price is public information and the demand is 
completely inelastic to price regardless of investor heterogeneity.  
B.   The Issuer’s Decision 
Suppose the firm has total N shares outstanding and is informed of the intrinsic value of the 
stock, V, after the book-building process. The firm’s decision in the IPO involves two variables: 
the offer price 0p  and the number of shares to be sold Ns , where 10 ≤≤ s . The issuer’s 
decision is to maximize the value of existing shareholders’ investment subject to the pricing 
and sales constraints. 
         ( ) ( ) ( )20, ˆ210 ss
csNVsNpEMax
sP
−−−+=π  
          s.t.   
( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≤
−+−≤
Vp
pV
h
K
h
KKsN
0
0
2
2122
ρδ
    (6) 
The first term in the objective function is the proceeds from the sale of the shares and the 
second term is the value of existing shareholders’ retained shares. The third term presents a cost 
to the shareholders that occurs as a result of a deviation of the sale from an exogenous, desired 
sales level, sˆ . Sales objectives may arise due to various reasons, such as existing shareholders’ 
need for diversifying their investments and the issuer’s concern over aftermarket liquidity, 
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ownership structure, and control. 
The first constraint describes the pre-market demand, which derives from equation (5). The 
second constraint specifies the valuation condition that requires the offer price to be equal or 
less than the shares’ intrinsic value. The rational for this condition is the presumption that 
deliberates overpricing is not allowed. An alternative approach to the valuation constraint 
involves the addition of a penalty term in the objective function for the difference between the 
offer price and the intrinsic value, as in Khanna, Noe, and Sonti (2005). It is easy to show that 
these two approaches lead to qualitatively similar results. 
We first discuss the solution for the special case of homogeneous opinions. With 0=δ , 
there must be 0→h  and the pre-market demand requires efficient pricing Vp =0 , resulting in 
2/KD = . In this case, the demand is perfectly elastic and the supply dictates the trading 
volume. The solution in this case is equivalent to the aftermarket equilibrium, in which 
shareholders and the entrepreneur would be indifferent between keeping the existing shares and 
selling them to the public.  
Proposition 1.  With 0=δ , the equilibrium is characterized by fair pricing and a sale 
consistent with the trading in the efficient secondary market, in which Vp =0 and N
Kss
2
ˆ == . 
It is easy to verify that with 0=δ , the following solution satisfies all first-order conditions: 
Vp =0 , N
Kss
2
ˆ == , 01 =λ , and 22
K=λ .  
The following proposition presents the general solution with divergent pre-market opinions. 
Proposition 2.  With divergent opinions, 0>δ , there are two equilibrium outcomes:  
(i) When δ is sufficiently small such that the following condition is satisfied, 
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1
2
1
6 2
2
≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +
hN
cK
h
ρδ ,     (7) 
the IPO decision is characterized by fair pricing, in which 
      Vp =0            (8)     
and                  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
hN
Ks
6
1
2
2ρδ .     (9)   
(ii) When condition (7) is violated, the IPO is underpriced and we have: 
       
1
2
22
20 2
21
62
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −++−= hNcK
hNh
hNcK
chKVp ρδ    (10) 
and    ( ) ( )( )[ ]( )( )22
22
2
2
246
626
22 hNcKhNcK
chKhNcKhNK
hNcKN
cKs ++
++−−+=
ρδ .  (11) 
Proof:   See Appendix A. 
Equations (7) to (11) present the closed-form solution of the model, which determines IPO 
pricing and sale as a function of opinion divergence. We now derive more direct and testable 
predictions of the solution for the effects of opinion divergence on the IPO decision. Firstly and 
clearly, condition (7) is more likely to be violated when δ is greater. This implication gives us 
the first prediction: 
Prediction 1.  The more divergent the investors’ opinions in the pre-issue market, the more 
likely an IPO is underpriced. 
We then turn to the expected initial return on the issue, 
0
0
p
pV
R
−= . Equation (10) gives 
the offer price as a function of the stock’s fundamental value and opinion divergence, which we 
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denote as ( )δ,0 Vp . Since V is independent of δ , we have δδ d
dp
VPd
dR 0
2
0
1−= . Using (8) and (10) 
in this result gives: 
     
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
+
+×
=
IPOs. pricedfairly for 0
IPOs; dunderpricefor 
4
2
3 2
2
2
0 hNcK
hNcK
VP
d
dR
ρδ
δ   (12) 
The effect of opinion divergence on IPO return is non-negative and nonlinear. While opinion 
divergence does not affect the return for ex ante fairly priced IPOs, it increases underpricing for 
ex ante underpriced IPOs. This result leads to our second prediction: 
Prediction 2.  IPO return increase as the degree of opinion divergence increases. This positive 
link comes from ex ante underpriced IPOs. 
In our model, the selling of existing shares presents an equally important dimension, as the 
pricing, of the IPO. Equations (9) and (11) give the closed-form solution for the sale as a 
function of opinion divergence, which we denote as ( )δs . Note that the demand constraint is 
binding in equilibrium. Using this condition and by differentiation with respect to δ  we obtain 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+−= δρδδ
03
6
p
hN
K
d
ds . Using (9) and (11) in this result gives: 
 
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
−
+×−=
IPOs. pricedfairly For 
6
IPOs; dunderpriceFor 
4
2
6 2
2
hN
K
hNcK
hN
hN
K
d
ds
ρδ
ρδ
δ   (13) 
The sale of existing shares is negatively associated with the degree of opinion divergence. 
Moreover, this negative association is stronger for ex ante fairly-priced IPOs. This implication 
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gives our third testable prediction:  
Prediction 3.  The sale of existing shares in an IPO decrease as the degree of opinion 
divergence increases. This negative relationship is stronger with ex ante fairly-priced IPOs 
than with ex ante underpriced IPOs. 
This prediction is consistent with the literature of shares overhang in an IPO. The shares 
overhang is defined as the ratio of the number of shares retained by existing owners relative to 
the number of shares filed for sale to the public. Loughran and Ritter (2002) find that IPOs with 
greater shares overhang, that is, fewer shares sold relative to shares retained, might be more 
severely underpriced. They offer a prospect theory to explain this observation: the wealth loss 
of underpricing is compensated by the value gain to the non-selling shareholders. Bradley and 
Jordan (2003) also find that IPOs with greater overhang are underpriced more than those with 
smaller degrees of overhang.  
Our model provides an alternative explanation why the firm may want to float fewer shares. 
As opinion divergence increases, the increased risk due to the lack-of-information problem 
reduces the pre-market demand. This negative effect of increased risk is asymmetric between 
fairly-priced IPOs and underpriced IPOs. For fairly-priced IPOs, this effect leads to a full 
adjustment in the shares sold; for underpriced IPOs, this effect only requires a partial 
adjustment because it is partly offset by the reduced price because of the resulting greater 
underpricing.  
A further interesting prediction of equations (12) and (13) is that as the uncertainty in the 
firm’s output or the degree of risk aversion increases, underpricing increases and fewer shares 
are sold in the IPO. This prediction is consistent with the notion that the lack-of-information 
 15
problem poses an additional risk to investors, who in turn demand higher IPO return and whose 
demand for the new stock declines. An important implication here is that there is a link 
between the IPO decision variables and a broad range of risk related factors. 
III.   Evidence 
We use three variables as a proxy for the degree of pre-market opinion divergence. The first 
proxy is the price range filed with the SEC in the issuer’s preliminary prospectus, which we 
calculate as the price range in dollars divided by the middle point of the preliminary offer 
prices. Intuitively, the price range is set wider when it is more difficult for the underwriter to 
determine the fair value of the new stock. We expect a direct association between opinion 
divergence and the difficulty in IPO pricing. In particular, this preliminary price range presents 
a desirable proxy for pre-market opinion divergence because it is unaffected by any marketing 
activities during the IPO process. 
The absolute value of price update is the second proxy we use. This is the difference 
between the finalized offer price and the middle preliminary price, divided by the middle 
preliminary price. This proxy reflects the unexpected demand revealed after the book-building 
process. When there are more views on the aftermarket price or when such views are more 
divergent, there is a higher chance for the IPO to be initially mispriced in the sense that the 
preliminary offer price deviates greatly from the equilibrium-market price and, therefore, it is 
more likely for the offer price to be adjusted or to be adjusted to a greater extent. 
The third proxy we use is the absolute value of the prediction error of a model that uses pre-
market firm variables to estimate the stock’s aftermarket price. We call this proxy variable 
price residual. To obtain this variable, we first run regression for the 14th trading-day closing 
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price on the firm’s pre-issue variables, including revenue, shareholder equity, debt, net income, 
and industry and year dummy variables. Thereafter, we determine the price residual by 
normalizing the regression error, in absolute values, using the offer price. The 14th trading day 
price is used as a proxy for the IPO’s equilibrium market value. 2 As an indicator of 
unpredictable factors in new stock valuation, this proxy captures the influence of such factors, 
after controlling for pre-issue fundamental variables, on investors’ opinions and thus 
unexpected demand. If the price residual is greater, then it is more difficult for the investors to 
gauge the aftermarket price. Consequently, the pre-market opinions are more divergent. 
A.  Data 
We collect data on IPOs for the sample period from 1991 to 2004 from the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) New Issues Database. Following previous studies, we eliminate ADRs, 
closed-end funds, REITs, spin-offs, and unit issues by only choosing common stocks with the 
IPO flag equal to one. For each IPO, we collect information on offer prices, offer date, 
preliminary filing range, proceeds amount, shares offered, total shares outstanding before and 
after IPO, SIC code, and VC backing. To ensure that our results are not disproportionately 
affected by very small issuers, we exclude from the sample firms with an offer price less than 
$5 per share.  
The initial IPO return is calculated as the difference between the closing price at the end of 
the first trading day and the final offer price divided by the offer price. The shares sold in the 
IPO are the logarithm of total shares offered, including both primary and secondary shares, 
divided by the total shares outstanding after the IPO. 
                                                          
2 Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we use the 21st or 60th day stock price. We also use the 
firm financial items from Compustat, and include all the IPO and non-IPO firms in the regressions and 
use a dummy variable to identify all the IPO firms. The results are qualitative unchanged. 
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Information on accounting variables such as revenues, net income, and long-term debt are 
also collected from SDC. We use the data of such variables for the 12-month period 
immediately before the offering as the information available in the pre-issue market. To 
describe underwriter reputation, we follow Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark and 
Singh (1998) and identify the lead underwriter from SDC and assign a rank, in a 10-point scale, 
based on the Loughran and Ritter (2002) classification. The average rank of all leading 
underwriters is used when there are more than one leading managers. 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample, totaling 5,286 IPOs. 
The average offer price and average first trading day closing price are $13.48 and $16.60, 
respectively. With the mean and median initial returns being 19.49% and 6.26%, respectively, 
the distribution of the returns displays significant positive skewness as in Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). The average underwrite ranking in our sample is 6.83 and 33.7% of the issuing firms 
receive funding from venture capitalists.  
Panel A also shows summary statistics for the three proxy variables of opinion divergence 
that is, offer price range, absolute price update, and absolute price residual, which are averaged 
at 13.61%, 14.65%, and 0.44%, respectively. Panel B further presents the Pearson correlation 
coefficients among the three divergence proxies. As expected, the proxy variables are 
positively correlated, with all p-values significant at the 1% level. The strong positive 
correlations are consistent with the presumption that the proxy variables share the same 
information regarding pre-market opinion divergence. 
Table 2 reports the mean summary statistics of our sample categorized by the three proxy 
variables of pre-IPO opinion divergence. With each divergence proxy, we rank the whole 
sample and divide the sample into three groups of different opinion divergence (low, median, 
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and high). Panel A of Table 2 shows the statistics for the three groups based on price range. 
The average initial return is 23.2% for the group of high opinion divergence, which is notably 
higher than the average return of 14.2% for the group of low opinion divergence. Further, the 
group of issuers of high opinion divergence sells an average of 28.8% of total shares 
outstanding. This figure is about 10 percentage points lower than that with the low divergence 
group. Consistent with these two observations, the high divergence group is associated with 
low offer prices and small IPO proceeds.  
Panels B and C present the summary statistics for the issuer groups classified by the 
absolute values of price update and price residual, respectively. Consistent with Panel A, the 
numbers in Panels B and C indicate that compared with the low divergence group, the high 
divergence groups are associated with lower offer prices and thus higher initial returns, and 
with fewer shares sold and lower IPO proceeds. 
B.  Base Model Regressions 
According to our Prediction 1, IPOs associated with higher degree of pre-market 
divergence are more likely to be underpriced. We test this hypothesis using a logistic model, in 
which the dependent variable equals one if the initial return is positive and zero otherwise. The 
independent variables include a proxy for pre-market divergence and several controls that are 
commonly used in IPO pricing models. These control variables include proceeds  (Ibbotson, 
Sindelar, and Ritter,1988; Tinic,1988; Schultz, 1993), stock exchange (Lowry and Shu, 2002), 
pre-issue market conditions (Hanley, 1993), and underwriter ranking (Carter and Manaster, 
1990; Beatty and Welch, 1996). We also include in the regression dummy variables for high 
technology and the high-tech bubble period, which previous studies identify to be significant 
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factors in IPO pricing (Loughran and Ritter, 2004).3  
Hanley (1993) and others document a positive correlation between IPO initial returns and 
IPO price updates. This correlation is interpreted as evidence of reward for information 
production by institutional investors. Because we use the absolute value of price update as one 
of our opinion divergence measures, we also control for price update. To make sure our results 
are not driven by price update, we compared the regressions between those with and without 
the control for price update and found our results are very robust to the control. 
Table 3 presents the results for the logistic regressions. Consistent with our Prediction 1, the 
estimated coefficients on the proxies of pre-market divergence are all positive and significant. 
The significance level is particularly high with the first two opinion divergence measures. 
Consistent with our Prediction 1, higher degree of opinion divergence in the pre-market leads 
to higher possibility for an IPO to be underpriced. The regressions in columns 2 and 3 further 
suggest the difference between price update and our second proxy of opinion divergence; after 
we control for price update, while the coefficient on this proxy remains highly significant and 
the magnitude is almost doubled. 
We now proceed with our test for Predictions 2 and 3, the main results of our model. We 
run OLS regressions for the following specifications: 
 
Initial return = α0 + α1 × Proxy for divergence + α2 × Underwriter rank dummy 
                     + α3 × Price update + α4 × log(Proceeds) + α5 × Lagged Nasdaq return  
                     + α6 × VC-back dummy + α7 × High-tech dummy + α8 × Exchange dummy 
                     + α9 ×  Bubble dummy       (14) 
 
                                                          
3 We also examined the regressions with industry dummies using the Fama-French Industry 
classification, which cause no meaningful changes in our results. 
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Log(Shares sold) = β0 + β1 × Proxy for divergence + β2 × Underwriter rank dummy 
                     + β3 × Price update + β4 × log of Proceeds + β5 × Lagged Nasdaq return  
                     + β6 × VC-back dummy + β7 × High-tech dummy + β8 × Exchange dummy 
                     + β9 ×  Bubble dummy       (15) 
 
The dependent variable in model (14) is the percentage return on the IPO for the first trading 
day, which measures underpricing. The dependent variable in model (15) is the logarithm of the 
ratio of shares sold to total shares outstanding after IPO. 
In Table 4, columns (1) to (3) present the regressions for IPO initial return, each with one 
opinion divergence proxy as the dependent variable. The coefficients on the three proxy 
variables are positive and statistically highly significant, which, consistent with our Prediction 
2, show a positive effect of opinion divergence on underpricing. In column (1), the coefficient 
for the preliminary price range is 0.219, which implies that for every one percentage point 
increase in the width of the filing price range, the new stock is underpriced by additional 0.219 
percentage point. The estimates in columns (2) and (3) are very similar, where the opinion 
divergence proxy is the absolute value of price update and the absolute value of price residual, 
respectively. Both indicate a significant positive effect of opinion divergence on IPO initial 
return. Given that none of our proxy variables rely on asymmetric information, we view our 
results to be evidence of the link between IPO pricing and any factors that make IPO pricing 
more difficult and thus pre-market opinions more divergent. 
The coefficient estimates for the control variables are mostly consistent with the existing 
literature. Several observations from the estimates are worth noting. Consistent with Hanley 
(1993) and others (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Liungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002), the 
coefficient on price update is significantly positive. This result is referred to as the partial 
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adjustment phenomenon, which explains underpricing as a reward scheme for information 
production. When underwriters discover a greater pre-market demand than anticipated, they 
partially adjust the price and leaves more money on the table to compensate informed investors 
for providing information during the book-building process. This control, however, has little 
effect on the coefficients for our opinion divergence proxies, which remain positive and highly 
significant in the regressions with or without this control variable being included. 
The coefficient on prestigious underwriter ranking is positive and significant. This is 
consistent with the findings of Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Chemmanur and Krishnan 
(2007). Recent studies on the relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing 
find this relation mixed or complex; it is negative in the 1980s and turns positive in the 1990s. 
The positive association between underwriter reputation and IPO initial return supports the 
agency costs argument and the market power hypothesis. However, it is inconsistent with the 
certification argument. 
Our estimates indicate a significant positive correlation between IPO underpricing and 
venture capital backing. This result does not support the presumed certification effect of VC on 
IPO pricing. Earlier studies, including Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990), 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Schultz (1993), argue that in addition to providing funds to 
the issuer, VC also adds value to the firm by providing enterprises in management and 
monitoring. Owing to this role of VC as certification, VC-backed IPOs should be priced closer 
to their intrinsic firm values in comparison with those that are not VC-backed. However, more 
recent studies, such as Hamao, Packer and Ritter (2000), Brav and Gompers (1997), and 
Bradley and Jordan (2002), find that underpricing is in fact more severe among VC-backed 
firms during the 1990s. Hence, our result for the VC effect on underpricing is consistent with 
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this more recent literature. 
Bradley and Jordan (2002) and Ritter and Welch (2002) argue that firm managers time the 
market condition to decide to go IPO and the underwriters time the market to set up the offer 
price. Consistent with this argument, in our regressions, the coefficient on NASDAQ composite 
index return (which is a proxy for market condition and investor sentiment) is positive and 
significant. In addition, as expected, the coefficients on the dummy variables for high tech 
industry and the bubble period are positive and significant. 
Columns (4) to (6) present our regressions for IPO sales, of which each includes an 
independent variable for the degree of pre-market opinion divergence. Consistent with our 
Prediction 3, the regressions show a negative effect of opinion divergence on the total primary 
and secondary shares sold at the IPO. All three coefficients for the divergence proxy are 
negative and significant at the one percent level. Take the coefficient on the filing price range 
as an example. At the value of -0.016, it implies that the issuer will reduce the sale of the stock 
by about one percent of its total shares outstanding for every one percentage point increase in 
the preliminary price range. 
The coefficients for the control variables in the regressions of IPO sales are mostly 
consistent with those in the regressions of IPO underpricing, of which most have a different 
sign while still significant. However, the coefficient on NASDAQ composite index return is no 
longer significant in the regressions for sales. This observation suggests that although the issuer 
and underwriter may have the incentive to time the market condition to make the IPO 
successful by realizing high initial returns, they do not adjust the sales following market 
conditions.  
In summary, the regressions show significant effects of pre-market opinion divergence on 
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IPO pricing and sales consistent with the predictions of our model. These effects are identified 
with each of our three opinion divergence variables, and they are robust to various controls. We 
note that the coefficient estimates are weaker with price residual than with other two proxy 
variables. One possible reason is the difference in sample size. The sample size is substantially 
reduced by the measure of price residual because it depends on the regression of IPO price on 
pre-issue firm variables that have missing values for many IPOs. 
As discussed above, previous studies find that some observations on IPOs differ 
dramatically from time to time. To check whether our results are sensitive to sample periods, 
we divide the whole sample into two subsamples, the IPOs from 1991 to 1997 and those from 
1998 to 2004, and rerun the regressions in Table 4 for the subsamples. Table 5 present our 
results from the subsample regressions, where the coefficients for control variables are not 
reported. Consistent with the whole sample results, the subsample regressions also indicate a 
significant positive effect of pre-market opinion divergence on IPO underpricing and a negative 
effect on IPO sales. This observation holds for both subsamples and there are no qualitative 
differences in the coefficient estimates between the subsamples.  
C.  Further Tests 
C.1.  Control for Endogeneity 
In our base model regressions, we use a variety of variables to control for firm 
characteristics and market conditions. We now perform two-stage regressions to further address 
potential firm heterogeneity or other endogeneity factors. We use industry-level return 
volatility and average turnover ratio as our instrumental variables. Our reasons for choosing 
these two instrumental variables are as follows. On one hand, many studies, including Shalen 
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(1993) and Harris and Raviv (1993), have documented a relationship between investor belief 
dispersion and stock volatility and trading volume. On the other hand, theory does not suggest 
any link between IPO underpricing (or sales) and these two variables and the extant empirical 
literature do not report any evidence on such a link. In addition, industry-wide stock volatility 
and trading volume are independent of idiosyncratic characteristic of issuers and hence are free 
of firm heterogeneity factors. We download the 48 industry daily return series from the 
French’s website. The industry-level volatility and average turnover are computed for the 30 
trading days preceding each IPO’s first trading day. In the first stage, we regress each of our 
pre-market divergence proxies on industry return volatility and industry average turnover ratio. 
Then in the second stage, we run regressions of IPO initial returns and shares sold on the fitted 
values of opinion divergence obtained from the first-stage regressions, controlling for various 
firm and market variables.  
Panel A of Table 6 presents the first-stage regressions. As expected, both industry volatility 
and trading volume are positively and significantly associated with the three opinion 
divergence variables. Panels B and C present our second-stage regressions. Compared with the 
base model estimates, the coefficients in these regressions are either similar (in two regressions) 
or greater (in seven regressions) and mostly remain highly significant. In particular, the results 
have noticeably improved with the regressions for IPO underpricing, in which all coefficients 
on the divergence variable are more than doubled and the t-ratios are higher. In conclusion, our 
instrumental variable regressions are consistent with the base model results, showing a 
significantly positive (negative) association of underpricing (shares sold) with the opinion 
divergence measures. These results lend further support to our model and, in particular, confirm 
that our estimates are not driven by unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
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C.2.  Underpriced IPOs versus Fairly Valued IPOs 
Our model predicts that the link between opinion divergence and IPO decision variables is 
asymmetric between IPOs: the positive link between IPO underpricing and opinion divergence 
comes from ex ante underpriced IPOs, while the negative link between IPO sales and opinion 
divergence is stronger for ex ante fairly priced IPOs. To test this prediction, we first estimate 
the likelihood of underpricing for each IPO using the logistic models in Table 6 (Panel B). We 
then divide the total sample into two subsamples at the median predicted likelihood, more-
likely underpriced IPOs and less-likely underpriced IPOs, and run regressions for each 
subsample. In order to minimize potential endogeneity, we use the predicated values of opinion 
divergence measures obtained from the first-stage regressions in Table 6 as our independent 
variables for the degree of opinion divergence.  
Panel A in Table 7 reports the results of the regressions for IPO initial return. For the 
subsample of more-likely-underpriced IPOs, the positive relation between underpricing and 
opinion divergence is notably stronger than those for the total sample regressions discussed 
above. The coefficients on the divergence proxies now have greater magnitude and are with 
higher significance levels. For less-likely-underpriced IPOs, however, the corresponding 
coefficient estimates are either insignificant or economically weaker. This asymmetric pattern 
of the underpricing-opinion divergence relation confirms our model’s prediction. 
The regressions of shares sold are reported in Panel B, which also show an asymmetric 
pattern highly consistent with the model’s prediction. The negative relation between shares sold 
and opinion divergence is significant and strong in all three regressions for the subsample of 
less-likely-underpriced IPOs. On the other hand, this relation is simply nonexistent for the 
subsample of more-likely underpriced IPOs, for which the coefficients are statistically not 
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different from zero in all three regressions. 
C.3.  IPO Proceeds 
We have so far established evidence to show that as the degree of divergence in pre-market 
opinions increases, the IPO is sold at a higher discount and fewer shares are placed. A direct 
implication of this finding is that the total amount of proceeds raised from the IPO decreases 
when the degree of divergence is higher. We test this implication by running regressions of IPO 
proceeds on an opinion divergence proxy. Table 8 presents the results for this test, where the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of total amount of money raised from both primary and 
secondary shares offered. Consistent with our separated regressions for IPO initial return and 
shares sold, all regressions in Table 8 show a significant negative correlation between IPO 
proceeds and the degree of opinion divergence. In particular, the results substantially improve 
after we control for potential endogeneity. In the two-stage regressions reported in columns (4) 
to (6), the coefficients on opinion divergence become five to nine times as high as the 
corresponding OLS estimates reported in columns (1) to (3). 
D.  Pre-market Divergence versus Aftermarket Divergence 
Miller (1977) predicts a link between IPO valuation and investor opinion divergence in the 
secondary market. In the presence of short selling constraints, investor divergence results in 
new stock overvaluation due to the demand of optimistic investors, and overvaluation increases 
when opinions are more divergent. This theory suggests an alternative explanation of IPO 
initial return: it is a phenomenon of short-term overvaluation in the aftermarket trading. Clearly, 
this theory is conceptually different from IPO underpricing theories, including ours, that model 
IPO initial return as a consequence of discounted sale of the new stock. As both Miller’s (1977) 
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theory and ours predict a positive relation between IPO initial return and investor divergence, 
the important question here is whether we can distinguish between the two theories empirically. 
Indeed, some recent studies report a positive association between IPO initial return and post-
IPO divergence measures and interpret this association as evidence of overvaluation consistent 
with Miller (Houge, Loughran, Suchanek, and Yan, 2001; Gao, Mao, and Zhong, 2003). 
However, a recent study by Edwards and Hanley (2007) casts serious doubt on the short-sale 
constrained overvaluation argument. In a direct examination of the Miller (1977) theory, they 
find that short selling does not limit observed underpricing. They conclude that the evidence is 
inconsistent with theoretical models that predict high initial returns by assuming constraints on 
short sales.  
In this section, we provide evidence to show that the link between IPO underpricing/sales 
and the degree of opinion divergence comes from pre-market divergence variables rather than 
from post-IPO divergence factors. For this purpose, we identify two measures of post-IPO 
opinion divergence and, in two steps, examine their relations with IPO initial return and sales. 
We first perform regressions of the post-IPO divergence measures on the pre-IPO divergence 
proxies, and decompose each post-IPO measure into two parts: the component that is explained 
by a pre-IPO proxy and the residual component. We then run regressions of IPO initial return 
and sales on these two components. Differences in coefficients between the two components 
allow us to compare their relations with the IPO decision variables. 
There are essential differences in underlying factors affecting divergent opinions between 
the pre-issue market and the aftermarket. By definition and according to our calculation 
methods, the pre-market proxies we use in above regressions capture opinion divergence 
arising from the missing information on the stock’s current market price. This problem 
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disappears after the stock begins to trade. Presumably, divergence in opinion still exists in the 
secondary market because of the co-existence of investor heterogeneity (e.g., in preferences) 
and uncertainty in the firm. The secondary market divergence can be gauged by variations in 
analyst forecasts and investors’ trading activities. Benveniste, Ljungqvist,Wilhelm and Yu 
(2003) suggest that the uncertainty in new issue valuation largely comes from the uncertainty in 
the firm’s future growth. Thus we use analyst dispersion in firm long run growth forecast 
(ADIGF) as our first measure of post-IPO divergence. We obtain analyst forecasts of long run 
growth from I/B/E/S summary history database and use as analyst dispersion the standard 
deviation of forecast normalized by the mean estimation during the year right after the IPO. To 
minimize potential bias caused by a small number of forecasts, we require a firm to have at 
least three financial analysts.  
Our second measure of post-IPO divergence is the post-IPO 60 trading-day daily return 
volatility (TDDRV), adjusted by market volatility, which is also documented to reflect 
divergence in opinion. To obtain this measure, we retrieve stock price data for each IPO’s first 
60 trading days from the CRSP daily stock file,4 and run regression of the stock’s daily return 
on CRSP market index return. The standard deviation of the regression residual gives us the 
measure of TDDRV.  
Panel A of Table 9 presents our first-stage regressions, in which the post-IPO divergence 
variables, ADIGF and TDDRV, are regressed on each of the three pre-market divergence 
                                                          
4 To avoid a potential offer price effect on the immediate aftermarket trading, we also examined the 
results by excluding the first a few, and up to 20, trading days after IPO and found the results are 
qualitatively the same. 
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proxies, filing price range, price update and price residual.5 The results highlight two 
observations on the relation and differences between the pre-market and aftermarket divergence 
measures. First, the coefficient on the pre-market divergence variable is positive and significant 
in all regressions. This result is expected because the common factors of investor heterogeneity 
and uncertainty in firm fundamentals cause divergent beliefs of investors in the pre-issue 
market and the aftermarket alike. Second, on the other hand, the small R-squared in all 
regressions in Panel A suggests the pre-market divergence measures explain only a small 
fraction of variation in secondary market divergence. In other words, the two groups of 
divergence variables reflect quite different underlying factors in shaping investor opinions in 
the market between before and after the IPO.  
By collecting residual and fitted values from the first-stage regressions, we decompose the 
post-IPO divergence measures into two components: the component that is explained by pre-
market divergence and the residual component. Then, in the second stage, we run the base 
model regressions for IPO initial return and shares sold (as shown in Table 4) by replacing the 
pre-market divergence proxies with the two orthogonal components of post-IPO divergence. 
Panel B of Table 9 presents the regressions with ADIGF as the proxy for the degree of post-
IPO divergence. The coefficients show a striking difference in explanatory power between the 
two components of ADIGF. The predicted component has a significant and strong effect on 
IPO initial return and sales, consistent with the effects we document for the pre-market 
divergence measures. On the other hand, the coefficients on the residual component are either 
insignificant or have a magnitude that is less than 10 percent of the predicted component 
                                                          
5 The sample size is dramatically reduced from 5,286 to 1,966 after we match the IPO sample with 
the I/B/E/S database. The sample size is also reduced to 3,860 when the IPO sample is merged with 
CRSP daily stock file.  
 30
counterpart. Panel C presents the regressions with TDDRV as the post-IPO divergence measure. 
The coefficients show a similar pattern of the substantial difference between the predicted 
component and the residual components of TDDRV. 
These results allow us to draw two conclusions: (i) The link between IPO underpricing (or 
sales) and the post-IPO divergence measures comes from these measures’ correlation with pre-
market divergence factors; (ii) much of the variations in the post-IPO measures is unrelated to 
pre-market factors and it does not explain the variations in IPO initial return and sales. These 
conclusions lend further support to our theory that the unique lack-of-information problem in 
the pre-IPO market results in divergent opinions that cause IPO underpricing. Edwards and 
Hanley (2007) provide evidence to reject the role of short-selling constraint – a necessary 
condition for Miller’s (1977) prediction – in underpricing. Our findings further explain why a 
causal relation can still be observed between IPO initial return and post-IPO divergence 
measures.  
IV.   Conclusions 
The key difference between the pre-issue market and the aftermarket is the information of 
the stock’s market price. Without this information, investors in the IPO face a common-sense 
uncertainty: They have to guess the aftermarket price and their guess may systematically 
deviate from the market expectation. This new-issue risk arises because of the coexistence of 
the missing information and heterogeneous investors. We model this lack-of-information 
problem and derive testable predictions for IPO pricing and sales. By examining a large sample 
of IPOs and using alternative proxies for pre-market opinion divergence, we document strong 
evidence consistent with our model’s predictions. We find that when pre-market opinions are 
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more divergent, the IPO is more likely to be underpriced or the degree of underpricing 
increases, and fewer shares are sold in the offering.  
Previous studies identify a positive association between IPO underpricing and uncertainty 
in pricing (e.g., Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Lowry, Officer, and Schwert, 2007). This association 
is often explained by asymmetric information, assuming that it is more difficult to price an IPO 
when there is a greater degree of information asymmetry. In contrast to this argument, our 
model offers a standard risk-premium explanation of this association. Because the lack-of-
information problem poses an additional risk, higher uncertainty in new issue pricing requires 
higher compensation to IPO investors. Equations (12) and (13) establish a direct link between 
the IPO decision variables on one hand, and uncertainty factors and investors’ risk-taking 
behavior on the other. Indeed, any factors such as market sentiment and variations in pre-
market performance that make new issue valuation less accurate or more difficult are expected 
to lead to greater risk to the investors. Therefore, our model extends factors in IPO 
underpricing from information asymmetry to a broader range of economic variables. The link 
of many such variables to opinion divergence and thus their relevance to IPO underpricing can 
be conveniently measured and tested. 
 
 
Appendix A:   Proof of Proposition 2 
The Lagrange function of the optimization problem (6) is 
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The first-order derivatives are:  
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
 
The sample is from the SDC database, which consists of IPOs between January 1991 and December 2004. Closing price is the first-day closing price of the IPO, 
and offer price is the finalized offer price. Proceeds are the total proceeds for the IPO, in millions of dollars. Return is the percentage difference between the 
closing price and the offer price. Range is the difference between the original high and low filing prices divided by the middle filing price. Abs(residual) is the 
absolute value of the error in the regression for the 14th trading day closing price on pre-issue firm variables. The residual is normalized by the offer price. 
Update is the difference between the final offer price and the midpoint of initial filing prices divided by the midpoint filing price. UW_rank is the 10-point scale 
for leading underwriter ranks assigned by Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998), modified by Loughran and Ritter (2004). Sold/SA is 
total shares offered, including both primary shares and secondary shares, divided by the total shares outstanding after the IPO. Revenue is the total revenues for 
the latest 12-month period, before the IPO, in millions of dollars. NI is the net income after taxes for the latest 12-month period, in millions of US dollars. Debt is 
the short-term debt plus senior debt and subordinated debt, in millions of dollars. VC is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the IPO is backed by venture 
capitalists and equal to zero otherwise. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of all variables. Panel B reports the correlation coefficients for the three proxy 
variables for the pre-market divergence in opinion.  
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Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 Observation Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Closing Price 5286 16.599 14.750 12.316 0.030 280.000 
Offer Price 5286 13.477 13.000 5.483 5.005 97.000 
Log(Proceeds)  5286 17.664 17.565 1.128 12.766 22.714 
Return 5286 19.493 6.250 44.068 -99.823 626.667 
Offer range 5286 13.611 14.815 7.460 0 92.308 
Abs(residual) 1940 0.437 0.299 0.612 0 14.868 
Abs(update) 5286 14.648 9.091 18.888 0 400.000 
UW_rank 5286 6.834 8.100 3.699 0 9.1 
Log(Sold/SA) 4150 -1.159 -1.181 0.724 -5.677 3.311 
Revenue 2688 299.802 37.600 1511.47 0.100 29232.60 
NI 2751 6.193 1.500 195.990 -6086.50 6671.90 
Debt 2742 299.94 6.600 2385.28 0.100 105503 
VC 5286 0.337 0 0.473 0 1 
 
Panel B. Pearson Correlation coefficient among the three proxies of opinion divergence 
 Offer Price Range Abs(Update) Abs(Residual) 
Offer Range 1 0.231 (<0.001) 0.084 (<0.001) 
Abs(Update) 0.231 (<0.001) 1 0.187 (<0.001) 
Abs(residual) 
 
0.084 (<0.001) 0.187 (<0.001) 1 
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Table 2.  Mean Summary of Sample Characteristics Categorized by Opinion Divergence 
 
With each pre-market divergence proxy (filing price range, the absolute value of price update, and the absolute value of pricing residual), we rank all IPOs and 
divide the whole sample into three groups of different (low, medium, and high) opinion divergence. This table presents the summary characteristics of each 
IPO sample group. Sold/SA is total shares offered, including both primary shares and secondary shares, divided by the total shares outstanding after the IPO. 
VC is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the IPO is backed by venture capitalists and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
Sample Group Observation IPO Return Sold/SA Proceeds Offer
Lead Rank 
dummy VC
 
Panel A:  Price Range as the Divergence Measure 
Low Range 1817 14.22 0.381 70.421 15.662 0.663 0.186
Medium Range 1723 21.27 0.282 46.177 13.750 0.710 0.408
High Range 1746 23.22 0.288 36.265 10.937 0.547 0.469
 
Panel B:  Absolute Update as the Divergence Measure 
Low Abs(Update) 1836 10.48 0.390 53.490 13.668 0.585 0.238
Medium Abs(Update) 1678 16.32 0.298 46.901 13.532 0.653 0.358
High Abs(Update) 1772 31.80 0.265 41.867 13.228 0.686 0.464
 
Panel C: Absolute Prediction Residual as the Divergence Measure 
Low abs(residual) 642 15.70 0.291 40.265 13.949 0.630 0.334
Medium abs(Residual) 650 16.11 0.290 34.346 13.242 0.631 0.342
High abs(Residual) 648 20.85 0.278 29.385 11.586 0.611 0.409
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Table 3.   The Opinion Divergence and the Likelihood of IPO Underpricing 
 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions of IPO underpricing on proxies of opinion divergence in the pre-issue market. The dependent variable is 
equal to one if the IPO initial return is positive, and zero otherwise. The independent variables include a proxy for opinion divergence, which is preliminary offer 
price range, the absolute value of price update or the absolute value of pricing residual. Price range is the difference between the original high and low filing 
prices divided by their average. Price update is the difference between the final offer price and the midpoint filing price divided by the midpoint filing price. 
Residual is the normalized residual of the regression for the 14th trading day closing price on firm characteristic variables available before the IPO. The control 
variables include the following: UW rank dummy is an indicator of leading underwriter prestige ranking, which is equal to one if the ranking is above eight and 
zero otherwise. Log proceeds is the logarithm of gross proceeds from the IPO in millions.  NASDAQ return is the NASDAQ index return 14 days preceding the 
IPO. VC dummy is equal to one if the issue is backed by venture capitalists and zero otherwise. Tech dummy is equal to one if the firm is a high technology 
company and zero otherwise. Bubble dummy is equal to one if the IPO is in 1999 or 2000, and zero otherwise. NASDAQ dummy is equal to one if stock is listed 
on NASDAQ and zero otherwise. p-values are reported in parentheses. The signs ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Dependent variable =1 if IPO return>0  (0 otherwise)  
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 
 
 
0.271 
(0.638) 
0.085 
(0.873) 
1.803 
(0.001) 
-0.960 
(0.401) 
Price range 
 
 
0.051*** 
(<0.001) 
   
| Price update | 
 
 
 0.010*** 
(<0.001) 
0.019*** 
(<0.001) 
 
| Residual | 
 
 
   0.039* 
(0.084) 
Price update 
 
 
0.032*** 
(<0.001) 
 0.036*** 
(<0.001) 
0.038*** 
(<0.001) 
UW rank dummy 
 
 
0.173** 
(0.016) 
0.172** 
(0.014) 
0.161** 
(0.024) 
0.022 
(0.868) 
Log proceeds 
 
 
-0.018 
(0.582) 
0.011 
(0.717) 
-0.082*** 
(0.008) 
0.114* 
(0.088) 
NASDAQ return 
 
 
0.033*** 
(<0.001) 
0.039*** 
(<0.001) 
0.030*** 
(<0.001) 
0.038*** 
(0.004) 
VC dummy 
 
 
0.159** 
(0.040) 
0.238*** 
(0.001) 
0.224*** 
(0.003) 
0.159 
(0.206) 
Tech Dummy 
 
 
0.140* 
(0.077) 
0.306*** 
(<0.001) 
0.184** 
(0.018) 
0.132 
(0.318) 
Bubble dummy 
 
 
0.154 
(0.136) 
0.278*** 
(0.005) 
0.143 
(0.164) 
0.217 
(0.454) 
NASDAQ dummy 
 
 
0.182*** 
(0.008) 
0.292*** 
(<0.001) 
0.270*** 
(<0.001) 
0.181 
(0.114) 
Observation 
 
5286 5286 5286 1940 
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Table 4.  IPO Underpricing, Shares Sold, and Opinion Divergence:  Base Regressions  
 
This table presents OLS regressions for IPO underpricing and sales on proxies of divergence of pre-market opinions. The dependent variable in the regressions in 
columns (1) to (3) is IPO initial return, which is the percentage difference between the first-day closing price and the offer price. The dependent variable in the 
regressions in columns (4) to (6) is the logarithm of shares sold divided by the total number of shares outstanding after IPO. UW rank dummy is an indicator of 
leading underwriter prestige ranking, which is equal to one if the ranking is above eight and zero otherwise. Log proceeds is the logarithm of gross proceeds from 
the IPO in millions.  NASDAQ return is the NASDAQ index return 14 days preceding the IPO. VC dummy is equal to one if the issue is backed by venture 
capitalists and zero otherwise. Tech dummy is equal to one if the firm is a high-technology company and zero otherwise. Bubble dummy is equal to one if the 
IPO is in 1999 or 2000, and zero otherwise. NASDAQ dummy is equal to one if stock is listed on NASDAQ and zero otherwise. White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistic is reported in parentheses. The signs ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Dependent Variable:  Initial return Dependent Variable:  Log(Shares sold/Total shares)  
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 
 
 
27.472*** 
(2.81) 
20.375** 
(2.29) 
31.849** 
(2.11) 
-2.231*** 
(-10.61) 
-2.573*** 
(-12.53) 
-1.476*** 
(-4.05) 
Price range 
 
 
0.219*** 
(2.42) 
  -0.016*** 
(-9.27) 
  
| Price update | 
 
 
 0.345*** 
(3.21) 
  -0.006*** 
(-6.18) 
 
| Residual | 
 
 
  8.078** 
(1.96) 
  -0.064*** 
(-3.61) 
Price update 
 
 
0.790*** 
(10.01) 
0.661*** 
(12.71) 
0.660*** 
(4.84) 
-0.003*** 
(-5.65) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.003*** 
(-4.05) 
UW rank dummy 
 
 
2.783*** 
(2.90) 
2.096** 
(2.15) 
3.159** 
(2.23) 
-0.187*** 
(-8.08) 
-0.181*** 
(-7.74) 
-0.141*** 
(-4.31) 
Log proceeds 
 
 
-1.399*** 
(-2.68) 
-1.052** 
(-2.14) 
-1.563* 
(-1.87) 
0.090*** 
(7.65) 
0.102*** 
(8.59) 
0.021 
(0.99) 
NASDAQ return 
 
 
0.686*** 
(5.10) 
0.668*** 
(4.88) 
0.435*** 
(2.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
-0.000 
(-0.10) 
-0.000 
(-0.13) 
VC dummy 
 
 
5.492*** 
(4.43) 
4.798*** 
(3.53) 
4.895*** 
(3.13) 
-0.073*** 
(-3.22) 
-0.090*** 
(-4.00) 
-0.004 
(-0.15) 
Tech Dummy 
 
 
8.054*** 
(6.03) 
7.908*** 
(5.87) 
3.788** 
(1.95) 
-0.137*** 
(-5.55) 
-0.156*** 
(-6.38) 
-0.112*** 
(-3.36) 
Bubble dummy 
 
 
33.606*** 
(14.63) 
31.588*** 
(12.28) 
41.660*** 
(5.84) 
-0.313*** 
(-10.49) 
-0.301*** 
(-9.81) 
-0.212*** 
(-2.71) 
NASDAQ dummy 
 
 
1.024 
(0.96) 
1.326 
(1.27) 
1.775 
(1.17) 
-0.090*** 
(-4.23) 
-0.117*** 
(-5.52) 
0.037 
(1.30) 
Observation 5286 5286 1940 4150 4150 1940 
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.387 0.358 0.171 0.163 0.053 
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Table 5.  Subsample Regressions for IPO Underpricing and Shares Sold 
 
This table presents subsample regressions for IPO underpricing and sales, using the same models as in Table 4. Coefficients on control variables are not 
reported in this table. White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistic is reported in parentheses. The signs ***, **, and * represent significance levels 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Initial return Dependent Variable:  Log(Shares sold/Total shares) 
Panel A:  Subsample for 1991-1997 
Price range 
 
 
0.170*** 
(2.61) 
  -0.014*** 
(-6.79) 
  
| Price update | 
 
 
 0.056*** 
(2.45) 
  -0.005*** 
(-3.77) 
 
| Residual | 
 
 
  15.086*** 
(3.66) 
  -0.109*** 
(-2.85) 
Observation 
 
2974 2974 1395 2180 2180 1395 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.184 0.182 0.246 0.115 0.110 0.034 
Panel B:  Subsample for 1998-2004 
Price range 
 
 
0.262* 
(1.75) 
  -0.015*** 
(-5.32) 
  
| Price update | 
 
 
 0.341** 
(2.04) 
  -0.004*** 
(-3.95) 
 
| Residual | 
 
 
  5.707*** 
(2.69) 
  -0.042** 
(-2.21) 
Observation 
 
2312 2312 545 1970 1970 545 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.406 0.415 0.376 0.169 0.164 0.034 
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Table 6.  Control for Endogeneity:  Two-stage Regressions 
 
In Panel A, we report the first-stage regressions, in which each pre-market divergence proxy is regressed on industry excess volatility and industry average 
turnover ratio, controlling for year dummy variables. We downloaded 48 industry daily return series and industry classification from French’s website. Each 
industry’s excess volatility is calculated based on the industry daily return in excess of the CRSP market index return during the period of 30 trading days 
preceding the IPO’s first trading day. Industry turnover ratio is the average turnover ratio within each industry for the 30 trading days preceding the IPO’s first 
trading day. In Panels B and C, we report the second-stage regressions, where we use the predicted values obtained from Panel A as the proxies for the degree of 
pre-market opinion divergence. Panel B presents the logistic regressions for the likelihood of underpricing and Panel C presents the regressions for IPO initial 
return and shares sold. All control variables are included in the second-stage regressions, of which the coefficients are not reported. White’s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistic is reported in parentheses in Panels A and C. p-values are reported in parentheses in panel B. The signs ***, **, and * 
represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Regression of IPO Divergence Proxies on lagged market volatility and turnover ratio 
 Price Range |Price Update| |Residual| 
Intercept 
 
 
12.904*** 
(25.67) 
7.254*** 
(5.49) 
0.076** 
(2.11) 
Industry excess volatility 
 
 
0.284* 
(1.93) 
1.558** 
(2.36) 
0.239*** 
(7.75) 
Industry turnover ratio 
 
 
0.173*** 
(6.04) 
0.532*** 
(7.08) 
0.025*** 
(5.76) 
Year dummies 
 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 
 
5286 5286 1940 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.093 0.091 0.069 
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Panel B:  Dependent variable = 1 if IPO return>0  (0 otherwise) 
Predicted price range 
 
 
0.074*** 
(<0.001) 
  
Predicted |Price Update|  
 
 
 0.060*** 
(<0.001) 
 
Predicted |Residual| 
 
 
  0.449 
(0.113) 
Observation 5286 5286 1940 
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.081 0.092 
Panel C:  Dependent variables = IPO initial return or the log value of shares sold 
 Initial return Shares sold Initial return Shares sold Initial return Shares sold 
Predicted price range 
 
 
0.694*** 
(3.43) 
-0.014** 
(-2.21) 
    
Predicted |Price Update|  
 
 
  0.843*** 
(4.92) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.76) 
  
Predicted |Residual| 
 
 
    17.907** 
(2.36) 
-0.270***
(-2.66) 
Observation 5286 4150 5286 4150 1940 1940 
Adjusted R2 0.377 0.156 0.381 0.156 0.352 0.071 
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Table 7.  Underpriced IPOs  versus Fairly Valued IPOs 
 
The regressions in this table make comparisons between IPOs that are, ex ante, more likely to be underpriced and those that are, ex ante, less likely to be 
underpriced. To do this, we first estimate the likelihood of underpricing for each IPO using the logistic models in Panel B of Table 6, and then divide the whole 
sample into two groups at the median likelihood. We run the regressions of IPO initial return (Panel A) and shares sold (Panel B) for each group. In order to 
control for potential endogeneity, we use as the independent variables the predicated values of opinion divergence obtained from Panel A of Table 6. Control 
variables are included in all regressions, of which the coefficients are not reported. White’s (1980)  heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistic is reported in 
parentheses. The signs ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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 More likely 
underpriced 
Less likely 
underpriced 
More likely 
underpriced 
Less likely 
underpriced 
More likely 
underpriced 
Less likely 
underpriced 
 
Panel A:  Dependent variable = Initial return 
Price range 
 
 
0.832*** 
(2.85) 
0.484** 
(2.23) 
    
| Price update| 
 
 
  0.911*** 
(2.84) 
0.381 
(1.52) 
  
| Residual | 
 
 
    19.350*** 
(2.97) 
12.327 
(1.02) 
Observation 2645 2641 2645 2641 975 965 
Adjusted R2 0.418 0.033 0.418 0.041 0.425 0.040 
 
Panel B:  Dependent variable = log(Shares sold /Total shares) 
Price range 
 
 
-0.006 
(-0.69) 
-0.020** 
(-2.32) 
    
| Price update | 
 
 
  0.003 
(0.51) 
-0.016*** 
(-2.58) 
  
| Residual | 
 
 
    -0.195 
(-1.25) 
-0.328*** 
(-2.77) 
Observation 2077 2073 2077 2073 975 965 
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.182 0.107 0.185 0.041 0.058 
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Table 8.  IPO Proceeds and Pre-market Opinion Divergence 
 
This table presents regressions for IPO proceeds, in which the dependent variables are the nature logarithm of total amount of money raised during the IPO, 
including both primary and secondary amounts offered. The independent variables are the same as in the regressions for IPO initial return and shares sold 
reported in previous tables. Columns (1) to (3) report OLS regressions. Columns (4) to (6) report two-stage regressions in which the predicted values of opinion 
divergence estimated from the first-stage regressions in Table 6 are used as the independent variable. White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistic is 
reported in parentheses. The signs ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 51
 
 OLS regressions IPO proceeds Two-Stage OLS regressions for IPO proceeds 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 
 
 
17.857*** 
(346.01) 
17.552*** 
(484.45) 
17.087*** 
(349.55) 
19.611 
(181.32) 
18.121 
(181.15) 
18.401 
(164.08) 
Price range 
 
 
-0.035*** 
(-12.98) 
  -0.169*** 
(-21.29) 
  
| Price update | 
 
 
 -0.008*** 
(-8.05) 
  -0.052*** 
(-6.49) 
 
| Residual | 
 
 
  -0.117** 
(-2.07) 
  -2.141*** 
(-9.20) 
Price update 
 
 
0.007*** 
(9.15) 
0.010*** 
(14.55) 
0.008*** 
(8.16) 
0.007*** 
(8.37) 
0.007*** 
(8.06) 
0.007*** 
(7.58) 
UW rank dummy 
 
 
0.809*** 
(25.49) 
0.845*** 
(26.89) 
0.920*** 
(21.90) 
0.860*** 
(27.87) 
0.808*** 
(24.50) 
0.830*** 
(23.68) 
NASDAQ return 
 
 
-0.009*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.001 
(-0.19) 
-0.003 
(-1.05) 
-0.004 
(-1.21) 
-0.003 
(-0.93) 
VC dummy 
 
 
-0.236*** 
(-8.76) 
-0.303*** 
(-11.03) 
-0.247*** 
(-6.16) 
-0.332*** 
(-12.50) 
-0.329*** 
(-11.82) 
-0.361*** 
(-12.20) 
Tech dummy 
 
 
-0.139*** 
(-4.76) 
-0.190*** 
(-6.45) 
-0.134*** 
(-3.12) 
-0.056* 
(-1.89) 
-0.113*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.166*** 
(-5.10) 
Bubble dummy 
 
 
0.363*** 
(10.47) 
0.382*** 
(10.93) 
0.576*** 
(6.04) 
0.688*** 
(18.34) 
0.984*** 
(9.39) 
2.116*** 
(10.97) 
NASDAQ dummy 
 
 
-0.315*** 
(-11.30) 
-0.397*** 
(-14.30) 
-0.252*** 
(-6.22) 
-0.324*** 
(-11.91) 
-0.386*** 
(-13.35) 
-0.377*** 
(-12.28) 
Observation 
 
5286 5286 1940 5286 5286 1940 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.280 0.248 0.305 0.321 0.248 0.263 
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Table 9.  Aftermarket Opinion Divergence and IPO Underpricing and Sales 
 
In Panel A we report the first-stage regressions, which are the regressions of two aftermarket opinion divergence variables on each pre-market opinion divergence 
variable. The aftermarket divergence variables are analyst dispersion in long-term growth forecast (ADIGF) and the 60 trading-day market-adjusted daily return 
volatility (TDDRV). In Panels B and C, we report the second-stage regressions, in which IPO initial return and shares sold are regressed on the fitted and residual 
components of each aftermarket divergence variable that are obtained from the first-stage regression. All control variables are included in the regressions in 
Panels B and C, of which the coefficients are not reported White’s (1980)  heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistic is reported in parentheses. The signs ***, **, 
and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A:  Regressions of aftermarket opinion divergence measures on pre-market opinion divergence measures 
Independent variables Dependent variable:  ADIGF Dependent variable:  TDDRV 
Intercept 
 
 
4.848*** 
(11.34) 
4.930*** 
(21.05) 
4.822*** 
(16.20) 
2.666*** 
(31.93) 
3.475*** 
(46.88) 
3.476*** 
(30.97) 
Price range 
 
 
0.098*** 
(3.30) 
  0.094*** 
(15.72) 
  
| Price update | 
 
 
 0.082*** 
(6.54) 
  0.032*** 
(6.54) 
 
| Residual | 
 
 
  1.399*** 
(3.34) 
  0.716*** 
(2.70) 
Observation 
 
1966 1966 832 3860 3860 1421 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.040 0.037 0.020 0.089 0.070 0.069 
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Panel B:  ADIGF as the measure of aftermarket divergence 
Regressions of IPO initial return Regressions of shares sold  
Independent variable Price range | Price update | | Residual | Prince range | Price update | | Residual | 
Predicted ADIGF 
 
 
2.105*** 
(3.79) 
8.274*** 
(7.88) 
5.934*** 
(3.40) 
-0.019** 
(-2.49) 
-0.063*** 
(-4.61) 
-0.060*** 
(-3.62) 
Residual ADIGF 
 
 
0.556 
(1.38) 
0.464*** 
(3.25) 
0.436* 
(1.65) 
-0.006 
(-0.47) 
-0.005** 
(-2.25) 
-0.004 
(-1.28) 
Observation 
 
1966 1966 832 1557 1557 832 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.509 0.548 0.449 0.129 0.138 0.081 
 
Panel C:  TDDRV as the measure of aftermarket divergence 
Regressions of IPO initial return Regressions of shares sold  
Independent variable Price range | Price update | | Residual | Prince range | Price update | | Residual | 
Predicted TDDRV 
 
 
4.013*** 
(4.54) 
10.028*** 
(4.15) 
9.439* 
(1.83) 
-0.278*** 
(-9.22) 
-0.196*** 
(-5.95) 
-0.111*** 
(-4.15) 
Residual TDDRV 
 
 
2.111*** 
(3.32) 
1.933*** 
(2.55) 
0.801 
(1.03) 
-0.028*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.027*** 
(-4.01) 
-0.025** 
(-2.20) 
Observation 
 
3860 3860 1421 3061 3061 1421 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.377 0.386 0.406 0.188 0.177 0.068 
  
 
